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FAMILY FIRMS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: TOWARD A DEEPER 
UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONALIZATION DETERMINANTS, 
PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES 
 
Abstract 
Research on the internationalization of family firms has flourished in recent years, yet the 
mechanisms through which family involvement shapes the determinants, processes, and 
outcomes of internationalization remain little understood and largely undertheorized. We 
contribute to research at the intersection of international business and family business by 
examining the roles of different sources of family firm heterogeneity and the context in 
shaping the determinants, processes, and outcomes of business internationalization. Drawing 
on this analysis, we summarize the articles published in this special issue and set out an 
agenda for further research aimed at advancing a more fine-grained and contextualized 
understanding of internationalization in family firms.  
 
Keywords: family business; family firms; internationalization; globalization; international 
diversification. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Family businesses dominate the economic landscape. According to the latest statistics from 
the Family Firm Institute, family firms account for two thirds of all businesses around the 
world, generate around 70-90 percent of annual global GDP, and create 50-80 percent of jobs 
in the majority of countries worldwide (Family Firm Institute, 2017). In the United States, 
one third of  S&P 500 firms are owned/controlled and/or managed by the founding family, 
family firms account for 89 percent of total tax returns, 64 percent of GDP, and employ 62 
percent of the total workforce (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Astrachan and Shanker, 2003). 
While the importance of family firms is even greater in Europe (Botero et al., 2015), they 
also significantly contribute to the growth of economies in South and East Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa (Tharawat Magazine, 2014). 
Globalization, aggressive worldwide competition, technological developments, and new 
growth prospects beyond national borders increasingly force family firms toward 
international diversification and global strategic growth to nurture their competitive 
advantage and/or to overcome economic downturns. Internationalization allows these firms to 
take advantage of economies of scale, lower labor costs and commodity prices, access to 
qualified and cheaper human resources and know-how in foreign industry clusters, and local 
opportunities for innovation. Internationalization is widely acknowledged as an important 
determinant of the sustained performance of family firms in the global economy. Irrespective 
of size, these firms have recently seen significant international growth through exports, 
foreign direct investments, contractual agreements, joint ventures, or a mix of these entry 
modes in foreign markets. In fact, many of the world’s largest multinational companies 
(MNCs) are family influenced (Casillas and Pastor, 2015), and several small- and medium-
sized family enterprises are internationally recognized for their globalization strategies (e.g., 
for recent analysis on German Mittelstand firms, see De Massis et al., 2018).  
Therefore, the interest of management and organization studies in family firm 
internationalization does not come as a surprise. Notwithstanding that the worldwide 
diffusion and international growth of family businesses has intrigued researchers for decades, 
the debate on the role of family involvement in influencing international diversification, 
growth, and performance is still far from conclusive.  
The first studies on this topic were published in the late 80s and early 90s. As the number 
of studies has exponentially grown in the last decade, the need to systematize them has 
recently prompted a number of reviews and meta-analyses (Kontinen and Ojala, 2010; Pukall 
and Calabrò, 2014; Arregle et al., 2017). Figure 1 reports the results of a search using the 
Web of Science and Scopus databases1. The trend is similar when using Google Scholar, with 
only four studies in the 80s, 11 in the 90s, 110 in the 2000-2010 period, and 234 in the 2011-
2017 period. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
The main question these studies address is whether family firms internationalize less or 
more than non-family firms generally in terms of foreign sales, exports, and – more recently 
– foreign direct investments. Research thus far essentially agrees that specific aspects 
distinguishing firms with family involvement from other forms of business organizations – 
such as the innate tendency of family owners to centralize and personalize administrative 
power (Carney, 2005), their personal investment and consequent parsimony (Carney, 2005), 
the pursuit of non-economic goals (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013; De Massis et al., 2018), and 
the asymmetrical treatment of family and non-family employees (Verbeke and Kano, 2012) – 
pose unique challenges for their growth and development. However, the same consensus does 
not exist in relation to the effect that the distinctive features of family firms have on the 
extent and form of internationalization.  
On the one hand, family firms are considered inclined to remain in their domestic markets 
and adopt conservative behaviors, tending to protect their socioemotional wealth (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007; Kotlar et al., 2017), which refers to the family members’ affective 
endowment, including family control and influence over the firm, their emotional attachment 
                                                     
1 We searched these databases using the following keywords: ‘family ownership’ ‘family firm’ ‘family-owned 
business enterprise’ ‘family coalition’ ‘family involvement’ ‘families’ ‘family business’ ‘family control ’ 
‘founder’ ‘founding family’ ‘lone founder’ ‘family business group’, in combination with ‘internationalization’ 
‘internationalisation’ ‘entry process’ ‘entry’ ‘international operations’ ‘international trade’ ‘globalization’ 
‘globalisation’ ‘international’ ‘global’ ‘mode of entry’ ‘foreign’ ‘export’ ‘international sales’ ‘international 
commitments’ ‘multinational’ ‘foreign direct investment’ ‘global strategy’, and ensured the substantial 
relevance of the findings combining the keywords with the paper titles. 
 
and shared identification with the firm, their social ties with stakeholders, and their desire to 
renew family bonds through dynastic succession. This view is consistent with the common 
assumption that family firms have a strong connection to their home regions and local roots 
(Bird and Wennberg, 2014). Moreover, family owners are likely to have a larger share of 
their capital bound to the firm (Casson, 1999), which often leads to their aversion to risky 
investments in international markets.  
Consequently, the majority of studies argue that family firms internationalize less 
(Fernàndez and Nieto, 2005, 2006). This is likely due to their well-known reluctance to  
dilute ownership, which may lead to the lack of not only financial resources needed to grow 
internationally (Anderson and Reeb, 2004), but also specialized management with specific 
knowledge of different consumer tastes, international distribution policies, production, and 
logistics (Graves and Thomas, 2006). Gómez-Mejía, Makri, and Larraza-Kintana (2010) 
support these conclusions arguing that family firms tend to be more conservative than non-
family firms. Therefore, risk avoidance considerations push family firms toward a greater 
focus on the home market, and when they do internationalize, they tend to focus on countries 
that are geographically and culturally closer.  
On the other hand, family firms have recently been recognized as important protagonists 
of international entrepreneurship. Their particular characteristics, the strength of family 
involvement and emotional attachment to the firm, e.g., firm-specific human capital 
(Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010), patient capital and long-term orientation (De Massis et al., 
2018), lower agency costs (Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2004; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2006), and higher endowment of social capital (Gallo and Pont, 1996; Piva, Rossi-Lamastra, 
and De Massis, 2013; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003; Zhara, 2003) act as incentives to embark on 
global initiatives.  
Other scholars, such as Arregle et al. (2017) in their recent meta-analysis comparing 
family and non-family firms, find no statistically significant difference in their degree of 
internationalization. Specifically, family involvement is almost non-influential (Carr and 
Batemann, 2009) at least in large firms, or the relationship with internationalization may even 
have an inverted U-shape (Sciascia et al., 2012) where for a low level of family ownership 
the positive relationship holds, while for higher level of ownership the curve slopes 
downwards. 
Departing from these discussions, some authors (Verbeke and Kano, 2012; Hennart, 
Majocchi and Forlani, 2017) argue that the question of whether family firms internationalize 
more or less than their non-family counterparts is ill-posed, since every firm has an optimal 
level of internationalization, and the important theoretical problem to address is under which 
conditions family firms tend to move toward or away from these optimal levels.   
In addition, scholars tend to use different theoretical perspectives to frame the relationship 
between family involvement and internationalization, which in turn promotes the use of 
different empirical methodologies, often leading to different conclusions.  
This state-of-the-art clearly indicates that the relationship between family involvement and 
internationalization is quite complex, which requires accounting for the heterogeneity of 
family firms (e.g., Chua et al., 2012) and several contingency factors at the intersection of 
international business and family business, even suggesting assemblages of different 
theoretical perspectives (e.g., Reuber, 2016).  
In this article, we contribute to research precisely at this intersection of international 
business and family business by examining the roles of different sources of family firm 
heterogeneity and the context in shaping the determinants, processes, and outcomes of family 
firm internationalization, and by outlining some promising directions for future theoretical 
and empirical research on the internationalization of family firms. Furthermore, we 
summarize the papers in this special issue that constitute cutting-edge studies on the topic. 
 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF FAMILY FIRMS: THE KEY ROLE OF 
HETEROGENEITY AND THE CONTEXT 
Once acknowledged that family firms differ from non-family firms, it becomes key to 
examine the heterogeneity among family firms both theoretically and empirically (e.g., Chua 
et al., 2012; Arregle et al., 2017). Not all family firms are the same and not all pursue similar 
internationalization strategies. Accordingly, some studies investigate different types of family 
firms, exploring the differing role of family and non-family managers in the business (Graves 
and Thomas, 2006; Muñoz-Bullon and Sanchez-Bueno, 2012; Sanchez-Bueno and Usero, 
2014). 
In this vein, Majocchi and Strange (2012) investigate the role of board composition and 
the specific contribution of external members on the board of listed family firms with respect 
to their international diversification. Fernández and Nieto (2005, 2006) study the effect of the 
presence of second or subsequent generations in the management team, finding a positive 
relationship with export propensity and intensity in a sample of Spanish firms in the1991-
1999 period. Sciascia et al. (2012) analyze the combination of family and external capital, 
concluding that an optimal mix exists. Arriving at similar conclusions, Arregle et al. (2012) 
study the difference between family-owned and family-influenced firms, while D’Angelo et 
al. (2017)  argue that to promote export performance, the hiring of external managers should 
be sustained and reinforced with a parallel action to attract external capital. 
However, all these studies investigate the impact of family firm heterogeneity on one 
specific dimension of internationalization, i.e., foreign sales/exports, ignoring other relevant 
dimensions, such as foreign direct investments (FDIs). Although a number of studies recently 
studied FDIs in the context of family firms (Carney et al., 2017), the findings are still 
inconclusive. Investigating the Indian automotive and pharmaceutical sector, Bhaumik, 
Driffield, and Pal (2010) find that family firms are less likely to invest overseas, while Lien 
et al. (2005) analyze a sample of Taiwanese firms and argue the opposite. Based on 
diversification motives, they find that family firms are more likely to undertake FDIs. 
Overall, while all these studies find that family ownership affects FDI policies, few 
investigate the role of different family characteristics on FDI decisions. This leaves 
considerable room to investigate the role of family heterogeneity, and whether and how 
family ownership and control affect other relevant internationalization dimensions, such as 
choice of entry mode (Boellis et al., 2016; Chang, Kao, and Kuo, 2014; Kuo et al., 2012. 
Liang, Wang, and Cui, 2014; Pongelli, Caroli, and Cucculelli, 2016), and internationalization 
speed (Lin, 2012). 
On a more general level, the inclusion of corporate governance variables in the theoretical 
framework is relatively new and would seem to be a promising direction for future research 
(Strange et al., 2009) challenging corporate governance literature. For example, agency 
theory makes clear predictions about performance, but produces mixed predictions about 
family firm internationalization. In its original version (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency 
theory posits that family ownership mitigates the potential conflicts between owner-
principals and managerial agents, lowering agency costs (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1999). 
However, in family firms, type-II agency costs (Villalonga and Amit, 2009) are amplified 
due to potential conflicts between large family shareholders (blockholders) and minority non-
family shareholders. In these circumstances, family owners may leverage their controlling 
position to extract private benefits at the expense of other minority shareholders (Cheng, 
2014; Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010). In both cases, while the consequences on performance 
are relatively evident (Miller, Minichilli, and Corbetta, 2013), the effect of the distinctive 
agency issues of family firms on internationalization are far from clear. Classic family-
centered stewardship theory offers a similarly ambiguous approach toward 
internationalization (Miller et al., 2007), emphasizing the strengths of family firms in terms 
of strong managerial identification with the firm, deep knowledge of the business, continuity 
and speed of command, social capital, and the strength of family brand names. However, 
these family assets may turn into limitations to international growth when requiring new 
knowledge, new managerial skills, and new capital (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Claver, 
Rienda, and Quer, 2009).  
Using a behavioral lens, the Socioemotional Wealth (SEW) approach identifies these same 
strengths and weaknesses of family involvement (Berrone, Cruz, and Gomez-Mejia, 2012), 
underlining the pivotal role of the utility that family owners derive from pursing family-
centered non-economic goals. Based on risk avoidance considerations, Gomez Mejia et al. 
(2010) argue that family firms are pulled in two opposite directions: toward greater 
internationalization to dilute geographically concentrated business risks, but also toward a 
lower level of export to preserve the family’s SEW, avoiding external funding and non-
family executives (Berrone et al., 2012). Based on their empirical findings rather than on 
explicit theoretical arguments, the authors conclude that the latter direction will eventually 
prevail.  
Since family firm behavior is affected by institutions and differs from country to country, 
another research stream investigates the role of the institutional setting and formal and 
informal country-specific institutions (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Carney et al., 2017). Arregle et 
al. (2017), for example, consider the moderating effects of the level of minority shareholder 
protection and trust toward people from other nations.  
The different empirical findings and theoretical approaches call for reconciling these 
seemingly incompatible family firm and internationalization theories. Different authors have 
recently moved into this promising direction, for instance, suggesting the need for a more 
general framework able to integrate internationalization, corporate governance, and family 
firm theories (e.g., Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2012), or using both agency and stewardship 
theories to justify the different international performances of firms with and without family 
leaders at high and low levels of regional focus (e.g., Banalieva and Eddleston, 2011), or 
integrating agency and stewardship theories into transaction cost economics (e.g., Gedajlovic 
and Carney, 2010; Verbeke and Kano, 2010, 2012; Majocchi et al., in press) to define family 
firms as a specific governance institution. 
 
Sources of heterogeneity in the internationalization of family firms 
Table 1 summarizes some important sources of heterogeneity that should be taken into 
account to understand the complexity of the determinants, processes, and outcomes of family 
firm internationalization: one the one hand, emphasizing the need to examine different 
sources of heterogeneity in family involvement, the behavioral propensities of the involved 
family, the strategic drivers of family firms, the internationalization processes and outcomes; 
on the other hand, emphasizing the need to examine the role of the context as a source of 
heterogeneous family firm internationalization behavior. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Family involvement  
The contention that family involvement affects firm behavior and performance is not new 
(e.g., Zahra, 2003), although some scholars have cautioned that family involvement is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for family firms to behave in a distinctive way, meaning 
that such involvement is insufficient to directly determine distinctive family firm processes 
unless taking into account the behavioral propensities of the involved family, i.e., willingness 
and ability (De Massis et al., 2014; De Massis, Di Minin, and Frattini, 2015). More recently, 
some scholars (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2015) pointed to the importance of considering both the 
degree and type of family involvement to understand how family involvement translates into 
firm behavior. This entails capturing the heterogeneity of the family and its effects, an 
accomplishment that existing family business research has scarcely achieved (Combs et al., 
2017; Jaskiewicz and Dyer, 2017).  
Pioneering studies highlight the relevance of family structures (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003) 
and the family system (Olson et al., 2003) to understand family firm behavior and outcomes, 
and a recent study shows the implications of family functionality for family business 
innovativeness (Filser et al., 2017). However, we still lack a comprehensive overview linking 
the main family science theories and relevant dimensions of family heterogeneity to enable 
understanding the influence of family involvement (Jaskiewicz and Dyer, 2017), which may 
help us theorize how such involvement exercises its effect on family business behaviors and 
outcomes through a direct effect on the family’s behavioral propensities.  
Building on the work of Jaskiewicz and Dyer (2017), we identify four dimensions of 
family heterogeneity: family structures, family functions, family interactions, and family 
events. 
Family structure refers to a group of individuals who share family ties, consider 
themselves part of a family, and interact with each other (e.g., Galvin, Bylund, and Brommel, 
2012). Different families may be characterized by different structures (e.g., nuclear families 
vs. extended families vs. domestic partnerships vs. same-sex marriages vs. multiple 
marriages). Family structures may affect the managerial discretion of individuals, their 
capabilities through resource mobilizations, and their motivations; yet family business 
research implicitly assumes the prevalence of particular family structures, such as the nuclear 
family. 
Family functions relate to the functions families assign to their members and expect of 
them (Popenoe, 1996). Families can be responsible for different functions, such as ensuring 
that family members have employment and status, training and educating the young 
generation, elderly care, and old age security, spare time activities, etc. Understanding family 
functions is important because these influence the behavioral propensities of the involved 
families, for instance, by constraining access to the family resource pool or stimulating the 
family’s intention to perpetuate control in the hands of the family. Yet, empirical evidence on 
the way these functions may affect family firm behaviors and outcomes is rather limited. 
Family interactions refer to the type of interactions that characterize family member 
relationships. Three prominent family science theories have been mainly used to examine the 
heterogeneous interactions among family members: family communication patterns theory 
(Fitzpatrick and Ritchie, 1994; Ritchie and Fitzpatrick, 1990), parental control theory 
(Baumrind, 1971), and intergenerational solidarity theory (Silverstein and Bengtson, 1997). 
These respectively consider communication patterns in families, parenting styles, and level of 
intergenerational solidarity between parents and their adult children (e.g., family cohesion) as 
potential determinants of family firm behavior and outcomes (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017). 
Although pioneering studies indicate that lively family interactions can have important 
effects on specific family firm behaviors, such as, for instance, entrepreneurship behavior 
(Danes et al., 2008), this dimension of family heterogeneity has been largely overlooked in 
family business literature. 
Family events relate to those episodes in the family lifecycle that change the structure and 
functions of families and member interactions. Examples of family events are births, 
marriage, divorce, and remarriage. Such events typically determine shifts from one family 
lifecycle stage to another, which may have implications for family firm behaviors and 
outcomes. Although some family science theories, such as family development theory 
examining the common lifecycle stages of families (Mederer and Hill, 1983; Rodgers, 1964) 
implicitly point to the possible implications of family events on family firm behavior and 
outcomes, such implications have not yet been empirically accounted for in family business 
research.  
In summary, family structures, family functions, family interactions, and family events are 
four dimensions of family heterogeneity that should be taken into account to better 
understand both the degree and type of family involvement, and its effect on the behavioral 
and strategic propensities of the involved family. 
 
Behavioral propensities of the involved family 
Drawing on the work of De Massis et al. (2014, 2015), we distinguish three behavioral 
propensities that affect the involved family’s choice of strategic drivers to produce distinctive 
firm behavior: ability as discretion, ability as resources, and willingness. 
Ability as discretion is defined as the involved family’s discretion to direct, allocate, add 
to, or dispose of a firm’s resources. This includes latitude in selecting the direction of the 
organization and in choosing from among the range of feasible strategic, structural, and 
tactical decisions (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). 
Ability as capability refers to those capabilities that members of the involved family need 
or should use to lead the firm in the preferred direction. 
Willingness is defined as the involved family’s favorable disposition to engage in 
distinctive behavior. This has been attributed to transgenerational succession intentions, 
socioemotional wealth concerns, and commitment to the business (Chrisman et al. 2012; 
Gomez-Mejıa et al., 2007). These three behavioral propensities affect the strategic drivers of 
family firms, which we examine next. 
 
Strategic drivers of family firms 
Building on Chua et al. (2012), we identify three strategic drivers that family firms must 
leverage to produce distinctive behavior: governance systems, resources, and goals. 
Governance systems consist of the incentives, monitoring, and authority structures, as well 
as the norms of accountability that shape the policies and strategies a firm uses to create long-
term value for stakeholders (cf., Carney, 2005). The family exercising its ability as discretion 
to govern the firm may lead to the board of directors being entirely controlled by family 
members or ownership involving pyramids, cross-holdings, and dual voting class shares 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000), allowing the family to bypass the board when making 
strategic decisions (Carney 2005; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Likewise, the presence of a 
family Chairman/CEO or institutional investors is another aspect of heterogeneity in the 
governance systems of family firms. 
The resources of a family firm can be financial, social, human, and emotional 
(Habbershon and Williams, 1999), and how such resources are developed, deployed, and 
discarded depends largely on the involved family’s ability as capability. 
Goals in family firms can be economic vs. non-economic as well as family-centered vs. 
business-centered (Chrisman et al., 2012; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013) and are a major cause 
of heterogeneity of family firm behavior (Chua et al., 2012). The distinctive strategic goals of 
the family firm emerge as a result of the involved family’s willingness and abilities. For 
instance, if the family is not willing to pursue family-centered goals, instead prioritizing 
business-centered goals, then clearly the family-centered goals will not be pursued. Likewise, 
families that lack the discretion and/or capabilities needed to lead the firm in the preferred 
family-centered direction will not be able to pursue such goals, for instance, when there are 
influential non-family shareholders or managers who object, and/or when the family lacks the 
resources needed.  
 Internationalization processes 
Internationalization processes can be simplified into four key aspects: (i) locality vs.globality; 
(ii) scope, modes, and location choices; (iii) timing and speed of internationalization; (iv) 
international business models.  
The locality vs. globality trade-off refers to the extent to which a family firm chooses to be 
anchored to its local roots rather than pursue global growth and/or operate internationally. 
Family firms are often torn between their local roots and their desire and need for global 
growth and international activities (Graves and Thomas, 2008). For instance, the attachment 
of family firms to their home territory’s tradition (De Massis et al., 2016a) may lead them to 
be inclined to focus on the local context rather than pursue internationalization (e.g., Bird and 
Wennberg, 2014). At the same time, other types of family firm goals, as well particular 
resources and governance configurations, such as the presence of internationally-oriented 
institutional investors, may influence their decision-making toward becoming internationally 
more active.  
The internationalization scope, modes, and location choices are pivotal aspects of firm 
size and configuration. Scope refers to the firm’s geographic extent (Lin, 2012), while mode 
defines the means of entry in foreign markets, and refers to the degree of control over foreign 
activities. Whether family firms tend to internationalize toward closer countries rather than 
pursue a global scope (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) and whether family members prefer 
keeping control within the family (as they are typically unwilling to dilute their stake in the 
firm) are still open questions.  
How quickly firms become international after their foundation i.e., their speed of 
internationalization, is one of the more relevant aspects of the process (e.g., Casillas and 
Moreno-Menéndez, 2014). Once again, family involvement plays two opposing roles. On the 
one hand, family firms tend to be quicker in their decision processes, since family culture 
fosters a more homogenous management team that allows family firms to promptly react to 
changes in the environment typical of international markets (e.g., Kontinenand and Ojala, 
2012). On the other hand, the desire to protect family wealth and pass the business to future 
generations makes family firms more risk averse and therefore slower to leap into new 
markets without adequate preparation (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  
International business models refer to the options in terms of the focused (niche) vs. mass 
market (broad) strategy that family firms adopt in foreign markets (e.g., Hennart, 2014). 
When firms with fewer resources – especially in the case of small and medium-sized family 
firms – focus their activity on a limited range of high quality products and services targeted at 
a worldwide audience of knowledgeable customers, they can achieve significant international 
results (Simon, 2009; Hennart et al., 2017). Conversely, mass markets strategies typically 
require significant investments in foreign production facilities, distribution and marketing 
policies, but also specialized managers with extensive international knowledge (e.g., De 
Massis et al., 2018). These strategies are typically followed by larger family firms and family 
MNCs, such as Samsung, Tata Consultancy Services, Toyota, and Walmart. 
 
Internationalization outcomes 
The family firm’s internationalization outcomes and performance in terms of achieving both 
economic and non-economic goals will flow from the internationalization processes. 
Such economic and non-economic outcomes and performance can vary when considering the 
firm, its subsidiaries, the business and family systems. Under- or over-performance compared 
to the aspiration level ensuing from the goals may then lead to revising the strategic drivers, 
behavioral propensities, or even family involvement through feedback-loop processes.  
 
Context 
In an attempt to integrate the role of context in our framework, we focus on two broad 
categories of contexts (Banalieva, Eddleston, and Zellweger, 2014): first, the exo context, 
which refers to the economic, social, political, legal, cultural, spatial, and technological 
environment; second, the chrono context, which consists of the life courses of the family and 
business systems, and encompasses factors that lead to evolutionary or punctuated changes 
along the family’s and the business’s life, such as succession, business exit, mergers and 
acquisitions, declining performance, and environmental jolts. Both the exo and chrono 
contexts affect the determinants, processes, and outcomes of family firm internationalization. 
 
ARTICLES IN THE SPECIAL ISSUE 
The seven articles featured in this special issue draw on different theoretical perspectives and 
employ different methodologies. However, a number of common themes emerge: first, the 
focus on various dimensions of heterogeneity among family firms; and second, the role of the 
exo and chrono context. 
Hernandez et al. (2018) compare family and non-family firms and study how institutional 
distance influences their international location choice. Specifically, they argue that family 
firms do not respond to institutional pressures in the same way as non-family firms. Through 
a quantitative analysis of Italian firms observed in the period 2000-2013, the authors show 
that firms are generally more likely to choose foreign locations with higher institutional 
quality, i.e., countries with clearer rules, more secure systems, and more transparent 
institutions. Moreover, compared to non-family firms, family firms are less reluctant to 
invest. In locations with institutional voids, where family firms’ social capital facilitates 
access to and screening of new business opportunities (Carney, 2005), family firms may 
exploit their relational capabilities – those that enable them to better position themselves than 
non-family firms to benefit from the favors of politicians and other networks, thus confirming 
the role of the external (exo) context in influencing family firms’ internationalization 
decisions.  
Alessandri et al. (2018) consider both the distinction between family firms and non-family 
firms, and the heterogeneity among family firms. Specifically, the authors investigate the 
internationalization strategies (extent of internationalization, breadth of internalization, and 
home region orientation) of different types of family firms (i.e., weak family-owned, strong 
family-owned, and family-owned-and-managed) vs. non-family firms, considering how 
differences in family involvement alter the perceptions of potential gains and losses to 
socioemotional and financial wealth. Relying on a mixed gamble perspective and on a sample 
of 935 Standard & Poor’s 1500 firms from 2003-2006, their analysis shows that the nature of 
family involvement (i.e., family management and level of ownership) influences the 
perception of risk associated with potential losses of SEW from internationalization, thereby 
leading to diverse internationalization strategies among family firms. 
Likewise, although relying on the socioemotional wealth perspective and agency theory, 
Ray et al. (2018) show that the heterogeneity among family firms in their ownership 
structure, concentration, and family involvement in management influences the 
internationalization strategy in terms of export and outward FDI intensity. Drawing primarily 
on SEW and agency theory, the authors claim that family owners and managers are not 
favorably disposed toward a risky internationalization strategy. However, specific 
contingencies, such as the presence of foreign institutional owners, help family members 
improve their understanding of international markets, reduce the fear of the unknown, and 
appreciate the benefits of internationalization. Through an empirical analysis on a 
longitudinal panel dataset of 303 family-owned Indian firms listed on the S&P Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) 500 index covering a six-year period from 2007-08 to 2012-13, this paper 
uncovers some interesting facets of how heterogeneity in ownership and management 
influences family firms’ internationalization, especially in under-represented regions, such as 
Asia. 
Yamanoi and Asaba (2018) investigate the influence of family ownership on a particular 
aspect of the internationalization process, i.e., choice of entry mode in foreign markets, 
distinguishing between greenfield investments vs. acquisitions, and focusing on full equity as 
an ownership mode. Using data on foreign subsidiaries established by 117 Japanese public 
firms in the electronic machinery industry between 1996 and 2007, the authors find that 
family ownership increases the likelihood that the parent firm engages in a greenfield 
investment rather than acquisition to establish a foreign subsidiary, as well as the likelihood 
that the parent firm pursues full ownership of a foreign subsidiary rather than partial 
ownership. Moreover, they contribute to existing literature by showing the moderating role of 
the degree of corruption in the host country, which strengthens the positive relationship 
between family ownership and the likelihood of engaging in a greenfield investment relative 
to acquisition. In doing so, this article sheds light on the influence of an important factor 
linked to the exo context. 
Fang et al. (2018) examine how variations in the extent of family control, combined with 
differences in the goals of founding and later generation family owner-managers, influence 
their engagement in international activities (measured through the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales), and how the availability of knowledge-based resources moderates these 
relationships. Relying on a longitudinal analysis of Standard & Poor’s 1500 manufacturing 
firms, the authors show that compared to non-family firms, as the ownership of family firms 
managed by the founding generation of a family increases, internationalization decreases, 
whereas the amount of family ownership of firms managed by later generation family 
members has the opposite effect. However, they also find that the level of knowledge-based 
resources and founding (later) generation ownership positively (negatively) influence 
internationalization. In doing so, this article illuminates how one important factor 
characterizing family involvement (i.e., extent of family control) interacts with a chrono 
context variable (i.e., involvement of founding or later generations) to influence 
internationalization outcomes.  
In the only conceptual article published in this special issue, Kano and Verbecke (2018) 
investigate how the idiosyncratic characteristics of family firm governance cause 
internationalization patterns along two dimensions, i.e., location choice and operating mode. 
Relying on internalization theory, the authors argue, perhaps controversially, that there is no 
generic difference between a family and a non-family multinational enterprise’s 
internationalization path. However, bifurcation bias, defined as the de facto differential 
treatment of family or heritage assets vs. non-family assets, is a family-firm specific barrier 
to achieving efficiency in international operations. Specifically, in the short term, the most 
important difference in international operations is between bifurcation-biased family 
multinationals and other types of multinationals. In the longer term, biased decisions will 
become uncompetitive in international markets and will require either eliminating bifurcation 
bias from their governance practices or switching to another form of governance. Thus, the 
important differentiator in internationalization paths is not between family and non-family 
firms, but between bifurcation-biased family firms and all other firms.  
Stadler et al. (2018) focus on a type of inverse causality, i.e., the moderating effect of 
product and international diversification on the relationship between the presence of family 
and professional managers and economic performance measured through Return on Assets 
(ROA). Using a panel dataset of 262 German listed firms from 2000 to 2009, the authors 
show that international diversification (product diversification) negatively (positively) 
moderates the relationship between the proportion of family members in the top management 
team and the company’s performance.  
The study investigates how the degree and scope of a family firm’s international activities 
influence the achievement of organizational goals (i.e., a certain ROA) through the effects of 
resources, such as the human and social capital of family and professional managers.  
 
SOME DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
Despite the abundance of studies on family firms and their role in the global economy, major 
research avenues remain to be explored on the intersection between international business 
and family business. We start by acknowledging the need for further theoretical and 
empirical research that accounts for the high level of heterogeneity among family firms and 
disentangles the effects that variations in the forms of family involvement, behavioral 
propensities, governance systems, resources, and goals have on their internationalization 
processes and outcomes. For instance, how do the heterogeneous behavioral propensities of 
involved families and/or the ensuing variations in terms of their governance systems, goals, 
and resources shape internationalization processes? Moreover, we call for a more fine-
grained conceptualization of internationalization to understand how different forms of family 
involvement affect different aspects of internationalization processes, including, for instance, 
timing and speed of internationalization, scope and degree of internationalization, but also 
de-internationalization and divestments.  
Second, there is a need to more carefully include variables in theoretical and empirical 
studies capturing the exo context i.e., variables linked to industry, social, political, cultural, 
and technological factors, and their impact on firms’ internationalization processes. For 
instance, family firms are particularly concerned about their legitimacy and reputation and 
tend to behave as responsible corporate citizens that develop good relationships with local 
actors and institutions to achieve a strong level of social legitimacy. Therefore, the 
willingness and ability to develop strong and stable relationships with local stakeholders and 
institutions is a crucial factor influencing  family firms’ internationalization. Likewise, recent 
research points to the importance of more prominently taking into account the industrial 
sector when developing theories about firm behavior (De Massis et al., 2017), and we 
underline the potential of future studies employing sector-based variables to advance current 
understanding of the industry-specific determinants, processes, and outcomes of 
internationalization in family firms. 
Third, we call for future research adopting a temporal perspective when studying the 
internationalization of family firms. As such, we urge scholars to examine the influence that 
factors that occur over the family and/or business’ lifecycle may have on family firm 
internationalization. For instance, our knowledge of how intra-family succession intention 
(De Massis et al., 2016b) may affect the internationalization determinants and processes is 
still limited. Likewise, we still have little knowledge of generational effects on 
internationalization (e.g., comparing founder-led family firms vs. sibling partnerships vs. 
cousin consortiums, e.g., Gersick et al., 1997), or how situational variables, such as 
environmental jolts (e.g., Smith, 2016) and duration of family ownership (e.g., Zellweger et 
al., 2012), may affect the ability and/or willingness of family firms to internationalize their 
business. Overall, there is a need to understand whether and how the involved family’s ability 
and willingness to pursue internationalization change over time under the effect of scattered 
events or following cumulative processes. 
Fourth, our research agenda calls for more research aimed at understanding the 
performance implications of internationalization, and the role that governance-, resource- and 
goal-related characteristics of family firms have in determining internationalization 
outcomes. For instance, Lu et al. (2015) found that while internationalization has a positive 
impact on growth, it has a negative impact on profitability, and the governance system of the 
family firm positively moderates the relationship between internationalization and 
profitability. What are the economic and non-economic outcomes of the internationalization 
processes at the firm and subsidiary level? What are such outcomes at the family and 
business level? Moreover, further research is needed to illuminate the extent to which the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of a family firm change and/or interact with the 
internationalization process and outcomes.  
Table 2 summarizes some questions for future research associated with the research 
directions we have outlined above.  
Insert Table 2 here 
 
In addition to these four directions for future research, we also recognize some 
methodological and empirical challenges at the intersection of family business and global 
strategy literature. In this regard, special attention should be paid to ensuring the quality of 
ownership data in large-scale quantitative studies. The well-documented gap between first 
and ultimate owners (Faccio and Lang, 2002) can be particularly acute in the case of family 
firms where pyramiding, preferred share issues, and other similar legal tools are common to 
ensure family control. Similarly, particular care should be taken to address self-selection 
issues generating potential endogeneity problems. Family firms tend to be concentrated in 
specific sectors (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and in specific countries (Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Heugens, van Essen, and van Oosterhout, 2009), typically those with weaker corporate 
governance institutions. In other words, they are not randomly distributed among industries 
and regions, which raises potential endogeneity concerns that future empirical studies should 
adequately address. 
In conclusion, do we need additional studies on family business and internationalization? 
The answer to this question is undoubtedly yes. Beyond the future research directions we 
outline in this paper, we recognize the opportunity to integrate complementary approaches to 
explain family firms’ internationalization. Given the many contingencies that might affect 
internationalization in family firms, we have only started to scratch the surface of the issues 
that need to be investigated. Nevertheless, we will consider our efforts successful if we have 
encouraged other scholars to tackle some of the interesting research directions emerging from 
our examination of the determinants, processes, and outcomes of internationalization in 
family firms. 
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Figure 1. Number of family business articles on internationalization–related issues (1985–2017) 
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Table 1. Sources of heterogeneity to understand the determinants, processes, and outcomes of internationalization in family firms 
 
Family  
involvement 
 Behavioral 
propensities of  
the involved family 
 
Strategic drivers of 
family firms  
 
Internationalization 
processes 
  
Internationalization 
outcomes 
Heterogeneity 
aspects 
 Family 
structures 
 Family 
functions 
 Family 
interactions 
 Family events 
 Ability as discretion 
 Ability as capability 
 Willingness  
 
 Governance 
 Resources 
 Goals 
 
 Locality vs. globality 
 Scope, modes, and location choices 
 Timing and speed of 
internationalization  
 International business models 
 Economic vs. noneconomic 
performance 
 Firm vs. subsidiary 
performance 
 Family vs. business 
performance 
Context 
 
Exo context: economic, social, political, legal, cultural, spatial, and technological environment  
(e.g., industry features, network position, institutional investments; family institutions, financial markets, legal contexts) 
 
Chrono context: the family and business’ life courses 
(e.g., succession, duration of family ownership, family stage, business lifecycle, business exit, mergers and acquisitions, environmental jolts) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Some themes for a research agenda on internationalization in family firms 
Focus Research Gap Examples of Research Questions  
Family firm heterogeneity 
 
The impact that different 
sources of family firm 
heterogeneity have on 
internationalization 
processes  
 
Are internationalization processes (e.g., scope and speed of 
internationalization) affected by family functions (such as ensuring status to 
family members and education of young members)? 
 
Is the involved family’s structure (e.g., in terms of nuclear family vs. extended 
family) responsible for different internationalization processes? 
 
How do internationalization processes change under the effects of different 
family events that take place along the family’s lifecycle? 
 
Do the perceptions of distance of family members explain reliance on different 
internationalization processes in family firms? 
 
Which family characteristics (in terms of structures, functions, interactions, and 
events) are conducive to more effective and/or efficient internationalization 
processes? 
 
Are internationalization processes influenced by the characteristics of the 
family firm’s governance (such as the dispersion of family ownership, the 
composition of the top management team, the presence of institutional 
investors)? 
 
Is the ability vs. willingness paradox in family firms a barrier to the pursuit of 
certain internationalization processes? 
 
Are family firms slower or faster at internationalizing? Does family 
heterogeneity affect the speed of internationalization? 
Is entry mode affected by family firm strategic drivers? How? 
Exo context The impact that factors 
occurring in the external 
environment in which the 
family firm operates have 
on internationalization 
processes and outcomes  
How are internationalization processes (such as the extent of local adaptation or 
standardization, and the degree of local embeddedness) influenced by the 
interaction of formal and informal country institutions and the characteristics of 
family involvement?  
 
Are the resources needed to achieve superior internationalization outcomes 
influenced by the characteristics of the industry (such as R&D intensity) in 
which the family firm operates? 
 
How do family firms in different industrial sectors undertake different 
internationalization processes and/or outcomes? 
Chrono context The impact that factors 
occurring over time in the 
life courses of the family 
and the business have on 
internationalization 
processes and outcomes  
 
 
 
Are internationalization processes and outcomes influenced by generational 
effects? 
 
Do first and later generation family members differ in their willingness and 
ability to pursue internationalization processes? 
 
How do family firms adapt their internationalization processes to 
environmental jolts? 
 
How does duration of family ownership influence the willingness to pursue 
internationalization processes and the ability to achieve superior 
internationalization outcomes? 
 
What is the effect of succession on the internationalization processes and 
outcomes of family firms? Are there differences between internal (i.e., intra-
family) and external succession? 
 
How do business exits and/or mergers and acquisitions affect the 
internationalization processes of family firms? Do family firms exit faster than 
non-family firms from foreign markets? 
 
Internationalization 
outcomes  
The influence that different 
configurations in corporate 
governance, goals, and 
resources have on 
internationalization 
outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The influence that different 
internationalization 
outcomes have on family 
involvement and/or the 
behavioral propensities 
and/or strategic drivers of a 
family firm through 
feedback loops 
Which family characteristics (in terms of structures, functions, interactions, and 
events) are conducive to superior internationalization outcomes? 
What resources and capabilities are more conducive to superior 
internationalization outcomes (such as economic and non-economic 
performance of subsidiaries) in family firms? 
 
Is the ability vs. willingness paradox in family firms a barrier to the 
achievement of superior outcomes? 
How does the heterogeneity of internationalization processes in family firms 
influence their economic and non-economic performance? 
How do the effects on internationalization outcomes vary at the firm and 
subsidiary level?  
What are the performance implications of heterogeneous internationalization 
processes on the family and business systems? 
Do different internationalization outcomes flowing from the same 
internationalization processes vary among different types of family firms?  
How does the temporal evolution of the family and business systems affect 
internationalization outcomes? 
How do family firm internationalization outcomes influence the behavioral 
propensity of the involved family through feedback loops? 
How do family firm internationalization outcomes influence the strategic 
drivers of family firms (i.e., goals, governance, resources) through feedback 
loops? 
Do the characteristics of family involvement (such as the functions exerted by 
the involved family) change over time as a result of internationalization 
outcomes? 
 
 
 
 
